Ten Ships a Day: The Strait Now Has a Traffic Count, and Tehran Wants to Turn It Into a Licence
Kpler puts Hormuz transits at their lowest since May. Iran’s new security chief answers with a “restricted zone” and a corridor whose gate Tehran will keep. Riyadh’s reply so far is a phone call and a signature in Berlin.
The strait has a number now, and it is ten. Kpler’s 10-day moving average of commodity vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz fell to 10 a day on Sunday, September 6, from more than 15 on Friday and nearly 13 on Saturday, the lowest reading since May. Only two vessels passed on Saturday, the day US Central Command disabled the IRGC tankers Downy and Stark 1 and destroyed the Kylo; six passed on Sunday, most of them on the Iranian-managed route. No very large crude carrier has left the Gulf since Wednesday. The UK Maritime Trade Operations weekly report counts 27 projectile strikes on vessels in and around the strait since July 6. Marisks, the Athens-based risk house, now rates the strait “extreme” for Iranian-linked tonnage and “materially elevated” for anything US-linked or US-escorted, which by definition includes every Saudi cargo sailing under American cover. Brent traded at $96.80 at 03:10 GMT on Monday, up 0.65 percent from Friday’s $96.28 close, the print Edition 4 told readers to watch.
Tehran’s answer to the count was to try to own it. Mohsen Rezaei, the newly appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told state television on Sunday that Iran will announce a “restricted zone” in the coming days or weeks, beginning near the line of the US blockade and running through the strait into the Gulf; vessels entering it with intent to transit will be placed on an Iranian sanctions list and barred from future passage without Tehran’s approval. In the same interview he said an Iran-Oman corridor agreement is expected “in the coming days”, with entry and exit “managed by Tehran”, and that the strait is otherwise “completely closed”, with seven or eight ships a day, five or six of them carrying Iranian essentials. He also said Iran had tested a destroyer-launched missile against a US vessel 48 hours earlier, and that mediators in Pakistan, Qatar and Oman had failed to hold Washington to the June memorandum. Parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf told an open session the same day that the era of “proportionate responses” is over and that any aggression will draw a “faster, heavier and more painful” reply. The IRGC separately claimed a strike on an unmanned US vessel entering the “protected area” of the strait; CENTCOM called the claim a “total lie”. Washington’s own count, as of September 6, is 92 commercial vessels redirected, three disabled and two boarded under the blockade, and Energy Secretary Chris Wright told CNN that about 9 million barrels a day are getting through, “probably two-thirds or more of pre-conflict flows” once pipelines are added. TankerTrackers’ August data, published Sunday, put Gulf seaborne exports 39 percent below the January-February baseline, so Wright’s figure is the upper bound of the available estimates, not the consensus.
Riyadh’s reply is documented in two readouts. The Saudi Foreign Ministry says Prince Faisal bin Farhan called Abbas Araghchi on Sunday to discuss “the latest regional developments and the efforts being made to enhance the region’s security and stability”. Tehran’s version, posted by the Iranian Foreign Ministry at 19:35 on September 6, says the two discussed “the latest diplomatic efforts to restore stability and address insecurity imposed on the Strait of Hormuz as a result of US aggressive actions”. It does not mention the Sidr or any Saudi vessel. On the same day, in Berlin, Prince Faisal and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul signed a memorandum establishing a foreign-minister-level strategic dialogue and “stressed the need to restore the Strait of Hormuz to its normal status”. That is the first joint Saudi text since the strikes to name the strait, and it was signed with a European, not with Tehran.
Rezaei’s zone is a permit regime dressed as a security measure: if Iran can put a hull on a list for attempting the strait, it charges rent on every transit without firing a missile, and he said as much when he predicted his “sanctions” would outweigh the strikes. For Riyadh the question is not the count but who publishes it. A Saudi cargo under US escort is now, in Marisks’ terms, materially elevated risk, and under Rezaei’s terms a candidate for a blacklist; the Kingdom has not yet said which authority’s rules its tankers sail under. The Berlin text is the clue: Riyadh is building the case for a multilateral navigation regime with capitals that have navies and insurers, and keeping the Araghchi line open so that Tehran cannot claim it was never asked. The observable is the corridor document. If the Iran-Oman text is signed and Saudi tonnage is routed through an Iranian gate, the Kingdom will have accepted a licence; if Bahri sails the American route and the count recovers above 15, it will have refused one.