Daily Edition No. 54 Monday, October 26, 2026 · Updated 05:33 Gulf thesaudi.info A MEFILES title

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Politics · Economics · Power · Read from Riyadh, not about it

Hormuz & Security · The Red Sea Front

Yemen, Bab al-Mandab and the Yanbu bypass · the second strait that decides whether the first one matters.

Two Straits

The JMIC Counted 101 Transits Through Hormuz in Three Days Against a Baseline of 138 a Day, and 58 Through Bab al-Mandab Against 61 a Day, While Tehran's Ambassador in Islamabad Offered to Reopen the Strait for an End to the US Blockade and Tasnim Called the Idea "Lies and Fantasy": The Red Sea Door Is Still Open, Which Is Exactly Why the Houthis Are Aiming at Yanbu

An LPG tanker was struck by an unknown projectile seven nautical miles north-east of Limah on October 22; 492 ships are waiting outside Hormuz; Bab al-Mandab recorded no attack on commercial shipping in the latest 72 hours and is rated "substantial" rather than "severe."

Three days of transits, October 22 to 24, against what three normal days would carryHormuz is running at about a quarter of baseline; Bab al-Mandab at about a third
Hormuz, three-day baseline (138 a day)
414
Hormuz, US-facilitated transits recorded
101
Bab al-Mandab, three-day baseline (61 a day)
183
Bab al-Mandab, transits recorded
58
JMIC figures as reported by Gulf News (Oct 25). Scale: longest bar = 414. The baselines are saudi.info's multiplication of the JMIC's daily historical baseline by three; the Hormuz count covers US-facilitated transits only and the JMIC says visible AIS traffic is in single or low double digits, so the two straits are not measured the same way.

The Joint Maritime Information Center's advisory for March 1 to October 25 keeps Hormuz at "severe," with deliberate hostile action "highly likely," and the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab at "substantial." Its numbers are the useful part. Between October 22 and 24 it recorded 101 US-facilitated transits through Hormuz against a historical baseline of about 138 a day, and 58 transits through Bab al-Mandab against a baseline of about 61 a day. It estimated 492 vessels waiting outside Hormuz on October 25: about 194 near Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, 178 off Dubai, 55 near Musandam and Sohar and 32 off Bandar Abbas and Qeshm. An LPG tanker leaving the strait was hit by an unknown projectile on October 22, seven nautical miles north-east of Limah, with no casualties; a separate attack west of Bukha was logged on October 21. Windward counted 293 vessels affected by jamming in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on October 21. The US blockade of Iranian ports continues, with 138 commercial vessels redirected by October 17 on CENTCOM's figures.

Tehran's position on reopening is being stated in two voices. Iran's ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, said at a seminar in Islamabad that Tehran had told Pakistani mediators, during visits by Field Marshal Asim Munir, that it would reopen the strait if Washington ended the blockade, and that Trump had rejected this, according to AP as carried by Iran International. The IRGC-affiliated Tasnim quoted a source calling Al Arabiya's account of such an offer "lies and fantasy," saying Iran "fundamentally does not accept any equation of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the blockade" and stands by seven conditions already conveyed. Trump, asked on Saturday whether he would strike, said: "There's a possibility I will. There's also a possibility we'll have a nice big beautiful agreement."

Assessment

The judgment is that the JMIC's own table explains Houthi targeting: Bab al-Mandab is carrying about a third of its normal traffic with no attack on commercial shipping in 72 hours, which makes the Yanbu bypass the one Saudi export route still functioning on something like normal insurance terms, and therefore the one Sanaa must threaten to matter in the Hormuz bargaining. The inference from the Islamabad remarks is that Iran's offer exists at ambassador level and is denied at IRGC level, which is the usual shape of a position Tehran wants Washington to hear without owning. The observable is the next JMIC 72-hour window: a Bab al-Mandab attack on a vessel with a Saudi link would move the Red Sea rating toward "severe," and would be the first such strike since the Yanbu claims began.

The Royal Court

Decisions, diplomacy as a system, and the guarantors · what Riyadh does, not what is said about it.

Athens Stays

Mitsotakis Told the Crown Prince at Al Yamamah on Sunday That the Greek Patriot Battery Deployed Since 2021 Will Remain in the Kingdom, Answering a Saudi Request While Washington Was Ordering Its Own People Out: Riyadh Is Rebuilding Its Air Defence Guarantee From Capitals That Have Fewer Options Than America

The battery has helped intercept Houthi drones and missiles directed at Yanbu; the two leaders discussed defence, energy, the East to Med Data Corridor and the second session of the Greece-Saudi Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation, whose date was not announced.

The Greek line, 2021 to SundayA battery, a council, a quadrilateral and a renewal, on one axis
2021 Greek Patriot battery deployed Jan 2025 First Supreme Council session Oct 23, 2026 Faisal meets Dar at the Istanbul quadrilateral Oct 25, 2026 Mitsotakis and the Crown Prince agree the battery stays
Dates per Kathimerini citing AMNA (Oct 25) and Asharq Al-Awsat citing SPA (Oct 24). The axis is not to scale: five years are compressed to show sequence, not interval. The 2021 point is the deployment year Mitsotakis cited, not a day.

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis was received by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Royal Court in Al Yamamah Palace on Sunday and informed him of Greece's positive response to a Saudi request: the Patriot battery Greece has kept in the Kingdom since 2021 will remain. Kathimerini, citing the Athens News Agency, reported that the battery has helped intercept Houthi drones and missiles directed at energy infrastructure in Yanbu. Mitsotakis condemned the attacks, spoke of "tangible solidarity," and told the Crown Prince that no restriction should be imposed on freedom of navigation because it "would set a dangerous precedent." The two reviewed progress since the first session of the Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation in January 2025, discussed the second session, and focused on the East to Med Data Corridor linking Europe and Asia through Greece and Saudi Arabia.

The visit lands in a week in which Riyadh's security relationships are being sorted by behaviour. On Friday in Istanbul, Prince Faisal bin Farhan met Pakistan's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, on the sidelines of the quadrilateral foreign ministers' meeting; SPA's readout said they condemned the Houthi attacks and "attempts to target civilian areas in the Kingdom" and discussed "safe and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Strait." On Sunday the US Embassy in Riyadh reissued its alert that non-emergency government employees and families were ordered to leave effective October 23. The fact is that Greece, with one battery, said yes to staying while the United States, with a fleet, said go. The inference is that Riyadh is now valuing partners by whether their deployments survive domestic politics, and a Greek Patriot defending Yanbu has just passed that test.

Assessment

The judgment is that the Greek decision is small in interceptors and large in precedent: a European air-defence commitment was publicly renewed in Riyadh by the visiting head of government, in the week the Houthi campaign reached the Hijaz, rather than leaked from a ministry. The inference is that the Crown Prince will seek the same public form from other European capitals with assets in the theatre, none of which has yet named a Saudi site in a statement located for this edition. The observable is a date for the second Greece-Saudi Supreme Council, and whether its communique names Yanbu.

Washington's Exit

The US Embassy Reissued Its Alert on Sunday as the Airport Reopened: Non-Emergency Staff and Families Ordered Out Effective October 23, "Special Authorization" Now Required for Any Saudi Airport, and a Warning That Hostilities "Have the Potential to Escalate Rapidly": America Is Describing the Kingdom in the Language It Uses for Places It Is Leaving

The alert attributes the hostilities to "Iranian-supported Houthis" attacking "civilian airports and other critical infrastructure resulting in civilian casualties," and tells Americans to expect further attacks, airspace closures and flight cancellations.

The American posture in Saudi Arabia, as the embassy wrote it on SundayThree dates and one rule
Oct 10
The Houthi strike on King Khalid airport that killed 13 and wounded about 300 and closed the airport for fifteen days
Oct 23
Effective date of the ordered departure of non-emergency US government employees and their families, first announced on Wednesday
Oct 25
Updated alert issued as Terminals 1 and 2 reopened, warning of further attacks, airspace closures and cancellations
Any airport
US government personnel now need special authorization to use any airport in the Kingdom, not only Riyadh
All items per the US Embassy alert as reported by Anadolu (Oct 25); casualty figures per CNBC and Al Jazeera (Oct 25). The alert's text was not fetched directly; quotations are as carried by Anadolu. An ordered departure is not an evacuation and the embassy remains open.

The embassy's language is worth reading as policy. The hostilities, it said, are by "Iranian-supported Houthis" who "have engaged in hostilities against Saudi Arabia, including attacks on civilian airports and other critical infrastructure resulting in civilian casualties and severe travel disruptions," and they "have the potential to escalate rapidly beyond that immediate area." It confirmed the State Department's order that non-emergency employees and their families leave, effective October 23, noted the airport's partial reopening "for domestic flights and some international services operated by Saudi carriers," urged "extreme caution" at any Saudi airport, and made special authorization a condition for its own personnel using one. CNBC reported separately that US officials have told The New York Times the United States and Israel have plans for fresh strikes on Iran after the November 3 midterms, and that Trump said on Wednesday something would happen "fairly soon."

The fact is that Washington has thinned its official presence in the Kingdom on the same weekend Athens thickened its military one. The inference is not that the alliance is ending; it is that the United States is managing its exposure to a war whose next phase it intends to start, and that Riyadh is being told, in consular prose, that the Kingdom will be inside the blast radius. For the Royal Court, the operative line is "beyond that immediate area," which reads as a forecast that the Houthi front and the Iran front are about to be treated as one.

Assessment

The judgment is that the alert is a timetable as much as a warning: an ordered departure effective October 23 and a strike window after November 3 bracket the fortnight in which Riyadh must decide how publicly to associate itself with an American operation it did not choose. The inference is that the Kingdom's answer will be read from its airspace, not its statements. The observable is any change to the Level 3 advisory before the midterms, or a CENTCOM notice naming a Saudi base.

Oil & Energy

The barrel as instrument · OSPs, OPEC+, the strait premium and what Aramco can actually move.

Monday Open

Brent Opened the Week at $114.92, Down $1.80 From Friday's Six-Month High, After Trump Spent Saturday Keeping Both a Strike and a Deal Open, and Despite Eleven Ballistic Missiles at the Kingdom: The Market Is Pricing the Post-Midterm Strike on Iran, Not the Houthi Salvo, and Arab Light at $108 Shows Who Is Paying the Difference

Brent gained 6.2 percent last week, its third consecutive weekly rise, and WTI 2.3 percent; Murban at $118.00 and the OPEC basket at $115.09 sit above Brent while Arab Light, on a two-day delay, is $108.28.

The board as Asia opened, dollars a barrelGulf grades above the benchmark, the Saudi marker below it
Murban
$118.00
OPEC basket
$115.09
Brent
$114.92
Arab Light
$108.28
WTI
$101.44
OilPrice.com price board at 20:26 CDT Oct 25. Scale: longest bar = $118.00, so the visual differences are compressed; the spread from Murban to WTI is $16.56. Brent and WTI are delayed futures quotes; Murban is a 15-minute quote; the OPEC basket is on a three-day delay and Arab Light on a two-day delay. These are not settlements and not Aramco's official selling prices.

Brent futures settled Friday at $116.72, up 3.1 percent on the day and the highest since April 29, with WTI at $103.27; the week added 6.2 percent to Brent, a third consecutive weekly gain. By the time Asian screens lit on Monday the OilPrice.com board showed Brent at $114.92, down $1.80, and WTI at $101.44, down $1.83, while Murban held $118.00 and the OPEC basket $115.09. Arab Light, on a two-day delay, stood at $108.28. The weekend's news was a ballistic salvo at Saudi Arabia, a reopened Riyadh airport, a Greek Patriot renewal and Trump telling reporters on Saturday that he might strike Iran or might have "a nice big beautiful agreement." The Hill reported that CENTCOM has follow-up strike plans ready pending White House authorization, and the Wall Street Journal that the USS George Washington's group is loading munitions.

The fact is that the price fell on a day the Kingdom was fired on eleven times and rose last week on remarks about a strike that has not happened. The inference is that the market has already discounted the Houthi campaign as a risk to Saudi cities rather than to Saudi barrels, which is correct so long as Yanbu keeps loading, and that the premium it is carrying is for Iran after November 3. Amrita Sen of Energy Aspects told CNBC on Friday the client question is no longer "if" but "before the midterms or after," and her view is after. The Arab Light discount to Brent, about $6.60 on the board, is the measure of the Kingdom's logistics problem: the grade that must be shuttled, insured and routed around two straits is the one trading below the benchmark.

Assessment

The judgment is that Riyadh's price is being set in Washington and Tehran, not Sanaa, and that the Kingdom's leverage over it has narrowed to one variable: whether its export system is seen to function under fire. The inference is that a confirmed hit on Yanbu, Rabigh or the East-West pipeline would be the first event to move Brent on Saudi news since the airport strikes, and that the Houthis know this. The observable is Monday's European open against $114.92, and whether Dated Brent's premium to futures holds above $20.

The Economy

SAMA, GASTAT, the budget, PIF and the giga-projects · the balance sheet behind the state.

The Tariff Cushion

King Salman Ordered a SAR 500 Monthly Allowance for State Employees, Retirees and Social Security Families on Sunday, the Same Day Saudi Energy and the National Water Company Announced Tariff Adjustments From January 1, and Lifted the Nitaqat Wage Floor to SAR 5,000 and Then SAR 6,000: The State Is Raising the Price of Power and Paying Citizens to Absorb It, in Wartime

The measures were issued on the Crown Prince's proposal; Saudi Energy told Tadawul it would disclose any material impact on results "in due course," and its shares closed down 1.65 percent at SAR 14.34.

The Nitaqat wage floor for a fully counted Saudi private-sector workerTwo steps, six months apart, after the measures take effect
Monthly wage, SAR
Step one · SAR 5,000 Step two · SAR 6,000
Figures per Asharq Al-Awsat (Oct 25). Scale: SAR 0 to 7,000 across the track. The dots sit within 15 percent of track width of each other, so the left label is anchored to end at its dot and the right label to start at its dot. The current floor before step one is not stated in the source and is not shown. Step one applies six months after the measures take effect; step two twelve months after step one.

Asharq Al-Awsat reported that King Salman, on a proposal by the Crown Prince, directed on Sunday a package of support measures to coincide with Saudi Energy's and the National Water Company's announcement of consumption tariff adjustments effective January 1, 2027. The package adds SAR 500 a month to civilian and military personnel on civil service salary scales and operational programme contracts, to retirees and to eligible beneficiaries under the Social Insurance system, and pays Social Security families a SAR 500 monthly stipend "to offset the impact of electricity and water tariff adjustments." For Saudis in the private sector, the minimum wage counted fully toward Nitaqat Saudisation quotas rises to SAR 5,000 six months after the measures take effect and to SAR 6,000 twelve months after that first increase. Saudi Energy's Tadawul filing, carried by Argaam, says only that it will adjust its electricity service tariff from January 1 "in line with the governance procedures for adjusting energy and water product prices" and will disclose any material impact in due course. The size of the tariff change was not published.

The fact is that the Kingdom announced a utility price rise and a wage transfer on the same Sunday its capital was under ballistic fire and its stock index closed at a five-year low. The inference is that the reform calendar is being held, not paused: the tariff step was due under the energy-price governance framework, and the Royal Court chose to pre-empt its politics with cash rather than defer it and signal that the war had reached the budget. The Nitaqat floor is the more consequential line, because it raises the cost of a Saudi hire for every private employer at the moment the Houthi campaign is thinning tourism, aviation and retail receipts.

Assessment

The judgment is that this is the first fiscal act of the war that reads as confidence rather than emergency: a state raising administered prices on schedule is a state that expects to collect them. The inference is that the SAR 500 allowance will be defended as permanent once granted, so the net budget effect depends entirely on the unpublished tariff number. The observable is Saudi Energy's "material impact" disclosure to Tadawul, or the regulator's publication of the new tariff bands, whichever comes first.

Five-Year Low

TASI Fell 2.65 Percent to 9,438.50 on Sunday, Its Lowest Close Since 2021, Taking October's Loss Past 1,000 Points or 9.6 Percent, With ACWA Down 6 Percent, Al Rajhi Down 2.84 and Aramco Holding to a 0.87 Percent Fall: The Market Has Repriced the Kingdom's Utilities and Banks for a Long War While Leaving the Barrel Alone

Turnover was about SAR 4.3 billion on almost 48 million shares; the index ranged from 9,682 to 9,368, Astra Industrial lost more than 8 percent on a 20 percent fall in Q3 profit, and East Pipes fell 9 percent going ex-dividend.

Sunday's falls, percentThe index against its heaviest names and its sharpest casualty
Astra Industrial (Q3 profit down 20 percent)
8.09
ACWA Power
6.00
Al Rajhi Bank
2.84
TASI
2.65
Saudi Aramco
0.87
Argaam daily market report and company price table (Oct 25). Scale: longest bar = 8.09 percent. Single-session percentage falls; Astra's move follows an earnings release and East Pipes (down 8.67 percent, ex-dividend) is omitted as a mechanical adjustment. Argaam's headline rounds the index fall to 2.7 percent; the table gives 2.65.

The Tadawul All Share Index fell 257 points to 9,438.50 on Sunday, which Argaam records as its lowest close since 2021, after trading between 9,682 and 9,368. October's loss now exceeds 1,000 points, or 9.6 percent. Turnover was about SAR 4.3 billion on almost 48 million shares. Aramco closed at SAR 25.18, down 0.87 percent; Al Rajhi at SAR 58.10, down 2.84 percent; SABIC at SAR 43.00, down 1.65 percent; SNB at SAR 34.10, down 1.50 percent; ACWA Power at SAR 141.00, down 6 percent. Astra Industrial fell more than 8 percent after reporting a 20 percent year-on-year drop in third-quarter profit, and a cluster of smaller names, among them Halwani Bros., Saudi Ceramics and Fitaihi Group, fell to or near their limits. Watani Steel, up 6 percent, led a short list of gainers. Saudi Energy, which filed its tariff notice the same day, closed at SAR 14.34, down 1.65 percent.

The fact is that the index's heaviest weight fell less than one percent on a day the index fell 2.65, so the selling was in everything but oil. The inference is that domestic and foreign holders are not pricing a loss of Saudi barrels, which Brent above $114 would reward, but a longer war against Saudi demand: utilities exposed to tariff politics, banks exposed to credit in a shuttered aviation and hospitality economy, and industrials whose third quarter is now printing the cost. ACWA's six percent fall on the day the state announced tariff adjustments and a cash cushion is the market's reading of who carries the regulatory risk.

Assessment

The judgment is that 9,438 is a political number as well as a financial one: the Kingdom's equity market has given back five years at the moment the state is asking citizens to accept higher utility bills and asking foreign carriers to come back. The inference is that any disclosed purchase by PIF or its portfolio companies in the names they already control would now be read as a floor, which is why none has been announced. The observable is Monday's close against 9,438.50, and any Tadawul disclosure by Aramco or a PIF portfolio company before the open.

Watch Tomorrow · saudi.info's Forward Radar

Carried from No. 53 (Oct 25): the coalition's Sunday ledger, resolved at one ballistic missile and two drones destroyed over the Riyadh region, one cruise missile toward Khamis Mushait and ten ballistic missiles toward the southern region, with two injured by debris in Khamis Mushait and Ahad Rafidah; debris in the Mecca region on Sunday, not established; a Saudi or Aramco statement on damage at Yanbu, Rabigh or the East-West pipeline, not established, Aramco not responding to CNBC; a coalition statement of its own targets in Sanaa and Hodeidah, not established; a fifth Houthi attack on Aden's airport, not established; a Turkish parliamentary date for the Mecca pact, not established; the text of the Egyptian House resolution, not established; a Faisal-Abdelatty bilateral, not established; a date for the next R4+E3 session, not established; an Arab Parliament statement under Al-Otaibi, not established; Jordan naming the Karak attackers' affiliation, not established; a State Department change to the advisory, partly resolved, the embassy's Sunday alert keeping the October 23 ordered departure and adding a special-authorization rule for every Saudi airport; Monday's Brent open against $116.72, resolved at $114.92 on the OilPrice board in early Asian trading; Dated Brent's premium past $20, not established; a UKMTO warning naming a vessel in the southern corridor, not established, the JMIC logging an October 22 strike on an LPG tanker off Limah; a Kpler or Vortexa shuttle update, not established; a Ras Tanura or Yanbu loading interruption, not established; an Energy Ministry statement on Petroline, not established; Aramco naming a stockpile partner, not established; Sunday's TASI close against 9,695.86, resolved at 9,438.50; an Aramco Tadawul disclosure, not established; the first departures from Terminals 1 and 2, resolved, with international services by Saudi carriers only and no non-national carrier handled; a foreign airline resumption date, not established; an FII Institute statement with dates, not established; GASTAT's Q3 flash GDP, not established; a National Debt Management Centre tap, not established.

  1. Hormuz & SecurityThe coalition's Monday ledger and whether an interception over Riyadh coincides with a scheduled departure window at King Khalid airport; any Saudi or Aramco statement on Yanbu, Rabigh or the East-West pipeline; the next JMIC 72-hour window and whether Bab al-Mandab records an attack on a Saudi-linked vessel; the Houthi position on Jabal Sabr above Taiz; a Civil Defence report of debris in the Mecca region.
  2. The Royal CourtA date for the second Greece-Saudi Supreme Council and whether its communique names Yanbu; a French or Italian statement renewing an air-defence deployment by name; any change to the US Level 3 advisory before November 3; the Egyptian House resolution text; a Turkish parliamentary date for the Mecca pact; a Faisal-Abdelatty bilateral.
  3. Oil & EnergyMonday's European open and settlement against $114.92 and Friday's $116.72; whether Dated Brent's premium to futures holds above $20; the Arab Light discount to Brent against about $6.60 on the board; a UKMTO warning naming a vessel in the Hormuz southern corridor; a Ras Tanura or Yanbu loading interruption; Aramco naming a stockpile partner.
  4. The EconomyMonday's TASI close against 9,438.50 and whether the 2021 low holds; any Tadawul disclosure by Aramco or a PIF portfolio company before the open; Saudi Energy's "material impact" disclosure or the regulator's publication of the new electricity and water tariff bands; the first non-national carrier handled at King Khalid airport; GASTAT's Q3 flash GDP; a National Debt Management Centre tap before month-end.
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