Daily Edition No. 76 Tuesday, November 17, 2026 · Updated 05:32 Gulf thesaudi.info A MEFILES title

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Politics · Economics · Power · Read from Riyadh, not about it

Hormuz & Security · The Strait and the Red Sea Front

Bab al-Mandab, the southern border and the strait · the routes and the launch sites that decide whether the barrel moves.

The Strait

Six Tankers Claimed by the IRGC, One Confirmed by UKMTO, a Third US Carrier in Theatre and Araghchi in Islamabad: Both Sides Spent Monday Raising the Price of the Southern Lane While Pakistan Offered the Only Table in the Room

The IRGC Navy said two more tankers struck mines on the strait's southern route on Monday and that six had caught fire since Sunday, a count Reuters could not verify; UKMTO confirmed that one outbound tanker was hit by an unidentified projectile with a fire in the engine room and all crew safe; the USS Theodore Roosevelt joined two other carrier groups in the CENTCOM area; and Pakistan's foreign minister said Islamabad would proceed with its mediation after hosting Iran's Abbas Araghchi at an ECO ministerial.

Claims, confirmations and steel in the strait, November 16What Tehran says, what the maritime authority confirms, what Washington has put in the water
6 tankers
Caught fire on mines since Sunday, by the IRGC Navy's own count; Reuters could not independently verify
1 tanker
Confirmed by UKMTO as struck by an unidentified projectile while outbound, engine-room fire, no casualties
3 carriers
USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush in the CENTCOM area, the first time since the Iraq war
1.7m bbl/d
Fourth-quarter supply surplus the IEA now expects as Middle East exports recover, having previously forecast a deficit
The tanker counts are not on one scale and do not describe the same incidents: the IRGC figure is a claim carried by Reuters and Saudi Gazette (Nov 16), the UKMTO figure a confirmation carried by Saudi Gazette and the Associated Press (Nov 16). The carrier count is Saudi Gazette citing agencies (Nov 16); the surplus is the IEA as cited by Reuters (Nov 16). The tiles are not comparable with one another.

The facts come in claims, confirmations and deployments. Reuters reported that Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Monday two oil tankers struck mines in the Strait of Hormuz, causing explosions, and that six tankers had caught fire in similar incidents on Sunday and Monday, adding that it could not independently verify the report. Saudi Gazette, citing agencies, carried the IRGC's Sunday account via Tasnim, that two tankers crossing the southern route "under direct US military guidance" hit mines that "lit up the skies for hours", and the regular navy's Monday statement that a "violator" tanker caught fire east of the strait and could not move; it noted it was unclear whether that vessel was among the six. The one independent datum is UKMTO's: at least one incident in the early hours of Monday in which an outbound tanker was hit by "an unidentified projectile", a fire in the engine room, no casualties, all crew safe, damage and environmental impact "currently unclear". The IRGC Navy also claimed to have captured an MQM-170 US drone intact south of Qeshm, the eighth drone it says it has brought down in the area; that too is a claim.

The deployments are firmer. Saudi Gazette reported that the USS Theodore Roosevelt arrived in the CENTCOM area to join the USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike groups, the first time since the Iraq war that three US carriers have been in the Middle East, within a build-up it put at approximately 19 warships including the Red Sea; that US aircraft struck Iranian launchers at Bandar Lengeh and Sirik on Sunday night after an Iranian drone attack on the US helicopter compound at Al Riffa air base in Bahrain, with CENTCOM denying any damage to US assets; and that Pakistan's Ishaq Dar said his country would proceed with its diplomatic efforts, with regional support, at an Economic Cooperation Organization ministerial in Islamabad attended by Iran's Abbas Araghchi. The National's Monday headline, which this edition could not read beyond its summary, was that Pakistan awaits a US response to Iran's latest proposals.

The inference, from Riyadh, is that the strait is being priced by claim rather than by hull: the IRGC's six is a number designed to keep insurers and charterers off the southern lane, UKMTO's one is the number the market can act on, and the gap between them is Tehran's deterrent. The judgment is that the arrival of a third carrier changes the balance of risk in the strait less than it changes the balance of patience in Washington, and that Islamabad's channel, the one mediation now openly in motion, is also the capital where the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani pact's apex committee is due to meet at the end of the month, which puts Riyadh's security guarantor and Tehran's interlocutor in the same room.

Assessment

The judgment is that Monday's pattern, Iranian attacks on Gulf soil and tankers answered by US strikes on the launch coast within hours, is now a cycle with a known period, and that the IEA's turn to a surplus forecast means the market has decided the cycle is survivable; the projection is that this complacency lasts exactly until a confirmed sinking or a named flag; the observable is whether UKMTO, a flag state or an operator names the tanker struck on Monday, and whether Pakistan's foreign ministry publishes anything describing the US response Dar is waiting for.

The Royal Court

Decisions, diplomacy as a system, the guarantors · where Riyadh's alignments are made and priced.

Diplomacy

Faisal bin Farhan Called Doha and Cairo Again on Monday and the Readout Named No Adversary: the Saudi Foreign Ministry Is Running a De-escalation Channel on the Day the Defence Ministry Changed Its War Commander

The Saudi Press Agency, as carried by Arab News, said Prince Faisal bin Farhan held separate calls on Monday with Qatar's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, on regional developments and "efforts aimed at de-escalation and maintaining security and stability", and with Egypt's Badr Abdelatty, on bilateral relations, "continued coordination and consultation" and support for diplomatic de-escalation efforts.

Monday's two readouts, as SPA framed themWho was called, what was named and what was not
2 calls
Qatar's Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and Egypt's Badr Abdelatty, separately, on Monday
3 themes
De-escalation, security and stability, continued coordination and consultation, in SPA's wording
0 states named
Neither Iran, Yemen nor the Houthis appear in the readout as Arab News carried it
Counts are drawn from the Arab News text of the SPA readout (Nov 16, 11:27) and from nothing else; the absence of a named state is a reading of that text, not a statement about what was said on the calls. The tiles are not on one scale.

The facts are brief and official. Arab News reported that Prince Faisal bin Farhan held separate phone calls on Monday with his Qatari and Egyptian counterparts, per SPA. With Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani he discussed "current regional developments and efforts aimed at de-escalation and maintaining security and stability in the region". With Badr Abdelatty the two reviewed Saudi-Egyptian relations and ways to develop them, discussed regional developments, and stressed "the importance of continued coordination and consultation, and supporting diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalation". Neither readout, as carried, names Iran, Yemen, the Houthis, the strait or Bahrain.

The inference is in the pairing. Doha is the Gulf capital with the longest open line to Tehran and the one whose mediation Washington has used before; Cairo is the Arab state whose troops the Saudi file has most discussed since the autumn and whose Red Sea canal revenue depends on Bab al-Mandab staying open. Calling both on the day the General Staff took over the Yemen war, and on the day Araghchi sat in Islamabad, is the Foreign Ministry keeping the diplomatic track visibly alive while the military track hardens. The judgment is that the omission of any adversary from the readout is deliberate: Riyadh is reserving the right to name Iran for a moment when it has decided what naming it will be followed by.

Assessment

The judgment is that the Saudi Foreign Ministry's Monday calls are the civilian half of a two-track day, and that their value to Riyadh lies in the counterparties rather than the content: Qatar for the Tehran line, Egypt for the Red Sea. The projection is that the next readout in this series carries a third capital, Muscat or Islamabad, within the week; the observable is whether SPA publishes a Faisal bin Farhan call with Oman's or Pakistan's foreign minister, and whether any Saudi readout this week uses the word Iran.

The Guarantors

Pakistan Says the Mecca Pact's Apex Committee Meets in Islamabad at the End of the Month: Three Months After Signing, Riyadh's Mutual-Defence Treaty Is About to Hold Its First Scheduled Top-Level Session in the Same Capital Mediating With Tehran

Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar said on Monday that "the apex committee of this body … will be actually meeting, hopefully, end of this month in Islamabad", AFP reported, referring to the mutual defence agreement Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed in Mecca in August, pledging to come to one another's aid in the event of an attack.

The Mecca pact in four datesFrom signature to the first scheduled apex committee, as AFP and Turkish Minute recorded them
August Mecca agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan Oct 5 Emergency meeting of the three delegations in Riyadh after Houthi attacks Nov 16 Dar: apex committee to meet in Islamabad, "hopefully" End of Nov Planned apex committee session, date not fixed
Not to scale. "August" is AFP's dating of the signing (Nov 16); the Oct 5 Riyadh meeting is Turkish Minute's photo caption on the same report and is not described in its text; the end-of-November session is Dar's stated hope, not a confirmed date. The timeline marks statements, not treaty obligations met.

The facts are one sentence from Dar and the treaty behind it. AFP, as carried by Turkish Minute, reported that Pakistan's foreign minister said on Monday the top security committee of the mutual defence pact signed with Saudi Arabia and Turkey was expected to meet in Islamabad later this month, quoting him: "The apex committee of this body … will be actually meeting, hopefully, end of this month in Islamabad". The three countries signed the Mecca agreement in August, pledging to come to one another's aid in the event of an attack; AFP placed the statement against the Houthi attacks on Saudi cities, oil facilities and shipping since July and the wider war that began with US-Israeli strikes on Iran in February. Turkish Minute's photograph shows the three delegations at an emergency meeting in Riyadh on October 5 to discuss their joint commitments after the Houthi attacks. The same Monday, Dar hosted Araghchi at the ECO ministerial in Islamabad and said Pakistan would proceed with its mediation between Washington and Tehran, per Saudi Gazette.

The inference is that Islamabad now holds two files that Riyadh needs kept apart and that Pakistan has every interest in keeping together: the guarantee it owes Saudi Arabia under the Mecca pact and the channel it runs to Tehran. An apex committee convened in the Pakistani capital in the same fortnight as an Iranian foreign minister's visit tells Tehran what the cost of a Saudi casualty would be, and tells Riyadh that its guarantor is also the mediator. The judgment is that this is the arrangement Riyadh wanted when it signed in Mecca: a nuclear-armed partner whose deterrent value to Saudi Arabia is highest precisely when it is talking to Iran.

Assessment

The judgment is that the apex committee's first scheduled session is the pact's first test of whether it has an institution or only a text, and that "hopefully" in Dar's sentence is the honest word. The projection is that the meeting happens, that Saudi Arabia sends its defence minister or his deputy rather than the Crown Prince, and that the communique mentions "aggression" without naming the Houthis or Iran; the observable is whether Islamabad or SPA announces a date and a head of delegation before November 30.

Oil & Energy

The barrel, the strait premium, OPEC+ and the capacity audit · what Riyadh earns and what it can still promise.

The Barrel

Brent Fell $3.40 to $92.44 on the Day Iran Claimed Six Tankers Burning: the Market Has Decided Hormuz Attacks Are Priced In and a 1.7 Million Barrel Surplus Is Not, Which Is the Worst Combination for a Kingdom Exporting Through Yanbu at a Discount

Reuters reported that Brent settled down $3.40, or 3.6 per cent, at $92.44 and WTI down $2.84 at $85.72 on Monday, as recovering flows through the strait reinforced the IEA's new forecast of a fourth-quarter surplus of 1.7 million barrels a day; Goldman Sachs expects Brent to average $88 next year and $78 by December 2027; OPEC said on X it held an online meeting on its review of members' maximum sustainable capacity; and China's October refinery throughput fell 2 per cent on the month.

Brent, Friday settlement to Monday settlementFront-month futures, US dollars a barrel, November 13 against November 16
Brent, front month
Mon Nov 16 settle: $92.44
Fri Nov 13 settle: $95.84
Scale: the track runs $88 to $98, so the $3.40 fall covers 34 per cent of its width; the left label is anchored leftward with translateX(-100%) and the right label is also anchored leftward with translateX(-100%) because it would otherwise clip at the track edge. The $92.44 settlement and the $3.40 move are Reuters (Nov 16); the Friday level is implied by that move and matches the $95.84 settlement reported in No. 75. Intraday levels are not plotted.

The facts are a settlement and a forecast. Reuters reported from Houston that oil settled more than 3 per cent lower on Monday as signs of recovering flows through the Strait of Hormuz reinforced expectations of a supply surplus, Brent closing down $3.40 or 3.6 per cent at $92.44 and WTI down $2.84 or 3.2 per cent at $85.72, even as fresh tanker incidents underscored the risk to Middle East exports. The IEA, in Friday's report as Reuters restated it, now expects supply to average 105 million barrels a day in the fourth quarter, 1.7 million above demand, having previously forecast a deficit, and said 71 million barrels of its members' March reserve release remain to be made available by end-February, 15 million of them diesel; about 15 million barrels a day of crude moved through Hormuz in 2025. Goldman Sachs said on Sunday it expects Brent to average $88 next year and slip to $78 by December 2027, with near-term upside from shipping attacks. China's October refinery throughput fell 2 per cent on the month and 8.1 per cent on the year, implying, by Reuters' calculation, a crude inventory build of 492,000 barrels a day. OPEC said on its X account that it held an online meeting on Monday to discuss its review of the maximum sustainable production capacity of its members and the wider OPEC+ group. BMI told clients the recovery of OPEC+ exports "remains fragile" and that physical constraints and the risk premium "will continue to dominate price action until a settlement is reached between Washington and Tehran".

The inference is that the market has separated the strait from the barrel: six tankers claimed burning by the IRGC produced a $3.40 fall, because the flows the IEA measures recovered faster than the headlines. For Riyadh that is the uncomfortable case. A Kingdom moving its exports west by pipeline to Yanbu at a logistics cost carries the war premium in its own accounts while the market refuses to pay it in the price. The judgment is that the capacity review OPEC discussed on Monday matters more than the day's settlement: if the audit ahead of the November 29 meeting trims members' claimed capacity, the quota arithmetic shifts in favour of the producers who can prove their barrels, and Saudi Arabia is the one producer whose proof is being tested under fire.

Assessment

The judgment is that Monday's settlement is a verdict on the IEA's surplus rather than on the strait, and that Riyadh now faces a price that discounts its risk without discounting its competitors' barrels. The projection is that Brent tests $90 before it retests $96 unless a tanker is confirmed sunk by a party other than the IRGC; the observable is Tuesday's settlement against $92.44, whether OPEC publishes any text from Monday's capacity meeting beyond the X post, and whether Aramco's December Arab Light OSP for Asia, still not established, widens or narrows the discount.

The Economy

SAMA, GASTAT, the budget, PIF and the giga-projects · the balance sheet that pays for the strategy.

Prices

Producer Prices Rose 6.6 Per Cent in September While Consumer Prices Rose 1.7 Per Cent in October: Saudi Factories Are Absorbing a War Premium That Has Not Yet Reached the Shelf, and GASTAT Has Now Printed Six Months of It

GASTAT's producer price index rose 6.6 per cent year on year in September to 110.0 points on its 2023 base, from 103.2 a year earlier, Argaam reported; manufacturing, 91.2 per cent of the index, rose 7.0 per cent, electricity, gas and steam 2.2 per cent and water and waste 3.4 per cent, while the consumer index for October rose 1.7 per cent.

Producer price index, annual change by month, 2026Per cent, January to September, GASTAT via Argaam
January
0.4
February
1.0
March
5.5
April
9.1
May
7.5
June
8.5
July
5.3
August
5.1
September
6.6
Scale: bars are proportional to 9.1 per cent, April's peak, so September's 6.6 fills 72.5 per cent of the track. Figures are GASTAT's monthly year-on-year changes as tabulated by Argaam (Nov 16); the index is on a 2023 base and measures domestic producer prices, not consumer prices, and the months are not additive.

The facts are GASTAT's table. Argaam reported that the producer price index rose 6.6 per cent year on year in September 2026 to 110.0 points on the 2023 base, from 103.2 a year earlier, and tabulated the year: 0.4 per cent in January, 1.0 in February, 5.5 in March, 9.1 in April, 7.5 in May, 8.5 in June, 5.3 in July, 5.1 in August and 6.6 in September. Manufacturing, weighted at 91.2 per cent of the index, rose 7.0 per cent to 110.74; electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply, 7.7 per cent of the index, rose 2.2 per cent; water supply, sewerage and waste, 1.1 per cent, rose 3.4 per cent. GASTAT, in Argaam's rendering, said the change "reflects price movements across the main economic activities covered by the index". Saudi Gazette's report of Sunday, carried on its most-read list, put consumer inflation at 1.7 per cent for October.

The inference is in the shape of the series. Producer inflation was below 1 per cent in the two months before the war began in February, jumped to 5.5 per cent in March and 9.1 in April, eased through the summer, and has turned up again to 6.6 per cent as the Hormuz disruption, the pipeline rerouting and the Houthi campaign fed into input costs. Consumer inflation has not followed: 1.7 per cent in October against a producer print of 6.6 for September is a gap of almost five points that someone is absorbing, and in a manufacturing-weighted index the someone is the factory and the energy subsidy regime behind it. The judgment is that the gap is a policy choice as much as a lag, that administered fuel and utility prices are doing the absorbing, and that the fiscal statement, still not established, is where the cost will eventually appear.

Assessment

The judgment is that the producer-consumer gap is the clearest single print of what the war is costing the Saudi economy below the headline, and that it is being paid in margins and subsidies rather than at the till. The projection is that October's producer index, due next month, prints above 6.6 if the rerouting continued through the month; the observable is whether GASTAT's detailed third-quarter release or the Finance Ministry's quarterly statement attaches a number to the energy and subsidy line, and whether any listed manufacturer cites input costs in a fourth-quarter guidance note.

Markets & PIF

TASI Closed Monday Six Points Higher at 10,264 While the State's Share of the Market Rose SAR 60 Billion in a Week and Foreigners Held 4.5 Per Cent: the Saudi Exchange Is Being Held Up by Its Owner, and Diriyah's SAR 2.4 Billion Alinma Loan Shows Where the Owner's Money Is Going

Argaam's market data put the Tadawul All Share Index at 10,264.36 at Monday's close, up 6.14 points or 0.06 per cent; its weekly ownership tables showed total market capitalisation up SAR 121.61 billion to about SAR 9.35 trillion in the week to November 12, government entities up SAR 60.34 billion to SAR 6.22 trillion and foreign investors at 4.50 per cent; and Diriyah Co. signed a SAR 2.4 billion financing agreement with Alinma Bank for hotel assets at Wadi Safar.

Who owns the Saudi Exchange, week to November 12, 2026Market value held by investor type, SAR billions, excluding corporate procedures
Government entities
6,219.67
Saudi corporates
1,548.75
Saudi retail (all tiers)
793.86
Foreign investors
420.40
Mutual funds
233.42
GCC investors
71.34
Scale: bars are proportional to SAR 6,219.67 billion, the government entities' holding, so foreign investors fill 6.8 per cent of the track. Figures are Argaam's weekly ownership table for November 12 (Nov 16); institutional and individual discretionary portfolio managers are omitted and the rows do not sum to the SAR 9,348 billion total. The table measures holdings, not flows.

The facts are a close, a table and a loan. Argaam's market page showed the TASI at 10,264.36 at the close of Monday, November 16, up 6.14 points or 0.06 per cent, down 0.43 per cent over five days, 6.00 per cent over three months and 7.13 per cent over a year. Its weekly ownership report showed Tadawul's market capitalisation up 1.32 per cent, or SAR 121.61 billion, to about SAR 9.35 trillion in the week ended November 12, with government entities' ownership up about SAR 60.34 billion to SAR 6.22 trillion, Saudi corporates up SAR 26.24 billion to SAR 1.55 trillion, Saudi retail up SAR 18.67 billion to SAR 793.86 billion, foreign investors up SAR 7.35 billion to SAR 420.40 billion, or 4.50 per cent of market value and 12.13 per cent of the free float, and foreign swap holders down from SAR 1.44 billion to SAR 0.20 billion. Government entities held 66.53 per cent of issued shares and 14.75 per cent of the free float. Separately, Diriyah Co. signed on Monday a SAR 2.4 billion financing agreement with Alinma Bank, the first between the two, for hotel assets at Wadi Safar; Argaam said Diriyah has awarded contracts worth more than SAR 110 billion and that the Wadi Safar master plan covers 62 square kilometres with luxury hotel brands, a golf course and an equestrian and polo club.

The inference is that the exchange's recovery week was the state's. Of SAR 121.61 billion added to market value, government entities accounted for SAR 60.34 billion, half, with Aramco the obvious vehicle; foreigners added SAR 7.35 billion and swap holders, the most mobile foreign money, fell by six-sevenths. Monday's flat close after Sunday's fall is consistent with a market whose marginal buyer is domestic and whose marginal seller is abroad. The judgment is that the Diriyah loan belongs in the same story: a PIF giga-project borrowing from a Saudi bank, first of its kind between them, to build hotels during a missile campaign on the capital is the state financing its own strategy through its own balance sheet, and it is the pattern the ownership table describes.

Assessment

The judgment is that the Saudi market is being held by the state's hands while foreign hands hold 4.5 per cent and loosen at the margin, and that this is sustainable for as long as the state's hands are full. The projection is that next week's ownership table shows foreign swap holdings flat near zero and government entities above SAR 6.2 trillion again; the observable is Tuesday's TASI close against 10,264.36, whether the exchange's next weekly table shows foreign ownership below 4.50 per cent, and whether another giga-project announces bank financing before the fiscal statement.

Watch Tomorrow · saudi.info's Forward Radar

Carried from No. 75 (Nov 16): the coalition naming a region beyond Riyadh, the Eastern Province, Makkah and Madinah, resolved in the negative, Monday's statement named Makkah and Riyadh; an Energy Ministry or Aramco statement on the two pumping stations, not established; a Yemeni line for al-Suqyah or Saudi strikes around Tur al-Bahah, not established, though Reuters' military sources now place the Houthis at Khor Omairah, 100 km west of Aden; a flag state, operator or UKMTO naming the IRGC's supertanker, not established, UKMTO confirmed one unnamed tanker struck by a projectile on Monday; a further Houthi prisoner release, not established, and the move on Aden, resolved as an advance to Khor Omairah by Yemeni military sources; SPA acknowledging a Trump call, not established; a GCC collective text on Bahrain naming Iran, not established; an Omani readout of Araqchi's Muscat visit, not established, Araghchi was in Islamabad on Monday; CENTCOM announcing the third carrier in its own words, not established, the arrival was reported by Saudi Gazette citing agencies; an SPA readout naming Iran, not established; Monday's Brent settlement against $95.84, resolved at $92.44; a maritime authority naming the attacked tanker, not established; an East-West expansion volume, route or partner, not established; the December Arab Light OSP, not established; an OPEC+ delegate comment on the capacity audit, resolved in part, OPEC said on X it held an online capacity-review meeting on Monday; Monday's TASI close, resolved at 10,264.36, up 0.06 per cent; the exchange's index level and foreign flows, resolved for the week to November 12 with foreign ownership at 4.50 per cent; a cost for November's rerouting, not established; GASTAT's detailed third quarter and the fiscal statement, not established, GASTAT published September producer prices at 6.6 per cent; SAMA's October bulletin and the SAIBOR fixing, not established; an insurer or SAMA comment on insurance costs, not established.

  1. Hormuz & SecurityWhether SPA publishes General Al-Ruwaili's first act as Joint Forces commander, a meeting with Yemeni commanders or a coalition statement under his name; whether the Yemeni government announces a new line west of Aden or a withdrawal from Qawah; whether Saudi Arabia comments on the Houthi claim of strikes in Sanaa and Harf Sufian; whether UKMTO, a flag state or an operator names the tanker struck on Monday; whether the coalition's Tuesday statement names a region beyond Makkah and Riyadh.
  2. The Royal CourtWhether SPA publishes a Faisal bin Farhan call with Oman's or Pakistan's foreign minister; whether any Saudi readout this week names Iran; whether Islamabad or SPA announces a date and head of delegation for the Mecca pact apex committee before November 30; whether Pakistan's foreign ministry describes the US response Dar is awaiting; whether CENTCOM confirms the Theodore Roosevelt's arrival in its own words.
  3. Oil & EnergyTuesday's Brent settlement against $92.44 and WTI against $85.72; whether OPEC publishes any text from Monday's capacity-review meeting beyond its X post; the December Arab Light OSP for Asia; whether Aramco or the Energy Ministry attaches a volume, route or partner to the East-West expansion; whether a tanker is confirmed sunk by any party other than the IRGC.
  4. The EconomyTuesday's TASI close against 10,264.36 and whether the exchange publishes Monday's breadth and turnover; whether next week's ownership table shows foreign holdings below 4.50 per cent; GASTAT's detailed third quarter and the Finance Ministry's quarterly statement; SAMA's October money and banking bulletin and the three-month SAIBOR fixing; whether another PIF giga-project announces bank financing.
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